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In 1974 the United States Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,' held that arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement did not preclude the same discrimination claim in federal court.
Less than three decades after the decision in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme
Court revisited this notion and, without superseding it, held that any waiver
of Title VII rights, in the context of a union negotiated collective
bargaining agreement provision must be "clear and unmistakable."' The
critics of Gardner-Denver have frequently argued, inter alia, against what
amounts to individual employees having two bites at the apple. Individual
employees are able to pursue both Title VII and other statutory claims in
court and also have access to union negotiated dispute resolution
procedures.' Despite these arguments, courts continue to recognize
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1. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
2. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (recognizing the
"tension" between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer but concluding that it was unnecessary to
decide whether Gilmer had so undermined Gardner-Denver). The opinion acknowledged
that the fundamental question remaining unsettled was the validity of any union-negotiated
waiver of an employee's statutory right to a judicial forum. Compare id. at 77 with Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Amanda Dealy, Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace:
Reconciling Gilmer, Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37 B.C.L.
Rev. 479 (1996) (arguing that courts should require arbitral resolution before allowing an
employee to file individual suit under the ADA); Carla Wong McMillian, Collective
Bargaining, and Title VII: Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 32 GA. L. REv. 287
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statutory interests in guarantees of nondiscrimination and access to the
courts in furtherance of the congressional commands against discrimination
and employment policies that serve interests distinct from those noteworthy
and customary labor policies under the collective bargaining agreement's
alternative dispute resolution procedures.4 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,5 the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement in a
securities registration application barred an individual employee from
pursuing his claim in federal court. The federal claim alleged
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). The Gilmer Court explained that an employee who wished to
avoid arbitrating his ADEA claim must show, inter alia, congressional
intent to bar waiver of his rights to a judicial forum.
This Article maintains that Gardner-Denver remains good law in the
framework of a collective bargaining agreement. While Gilmer is limited to
individual circumstances there is no inconsistency between the two
decisions and Gilmer does not undermine Gardner-Denver. In making this
contention, the Article reviews the Fourth Circuit decision in Austin v.
Owens Brockway Glass Container, Inc. 6 and maintains that the Fourth
Circuit's decision failed to appreciate the reasoning in Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer to the detriment of thousands of union employees.
The Article also examines the congressional history of Title VII, as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Civil Rights Act), including the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and argues that a complete review
of that history shows Congress intended to bar prospective waivers of
statutory complaints.
Part I generally examines the history of discrimination cases after
Gardner-Denver. Its primary focus is a review of some of the lower court
(1997) (explaining why courts should require a victim of sexual discrimination to exhaust
her remedies under a collective bargaining agreement before being allowed to file suit in
court against her employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Geraldine
Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 395 (1999) (contending that individuals may effectively resolve their statutory rights
in the arbitration forum).
4. Paris v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that
collective bargaining agreement did not divest federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
employees Title VII claims); Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the employer's preemption argument, noting that statutory rights exist
independently of the collective bargaining agreement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that Congress did not
intend to permit compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims and the arbitral forum at issue
was inadequate to resolve the plaintiff's ADEA claim); Darby v. North Mississippi Rural
Legal Servs., Inc., 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3060 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (refusing to require
employee to exhaust collective bargaining agreement rights before filing federal suit under
the ADA).
5. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
6. 78 F.3d 875 (1997).
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decisions that have cited Gardner-Denver with approval.7 It critiques some
of the lower court decisions that have questioned the validity of the notion
in Gardner-Denver in light of the Court's ruling in Gilmer.8 Part II focuses
on the congressional history of Title VII, particularly the history of the
Civil Rights Act, amending Title VII, and the ADA, regarding the waiver
of prospective statutory rights.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers Trilogy, 9 in 1960,
the Court has encouraged the arbitration of disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements. In the Trilogy, the Court proclaimed that grievance
arbitration would be the approved procedure for resolving industrial
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement. 0  For that
purpose, the Court limited the court's function to deciding whether the
parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute and instructed courts that
"[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."'1  Furthermore, the
Court analyzed the court's role in post-arbitration review of awards in the
Trilogy, concluding that courts should not reconsider the quality of an
arbitrator's decision. The following subsection examines how the Supreme
Court has applied its arbitration jurisprudence.
A. The Gardner-Denver Decision
The Supreme Court's preference for grievance arbitration as an
alternative to industrial strife was by no means a preference for arbitration
as an alternative for litigation of statutory complaints, as it clarified in
Gardner-Denver.2 The employee in Gardner-Denver was a member of a
7. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 912 (1997); Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1110 (1997); cf Martin v. Dana Corp, 135 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1997); Austin
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 980 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1490
(10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699-700 (11th Cir.
1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
9. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
10. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582; Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. at 599; American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568.
11. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 593.
12. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578; see also Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (stating that "[t]he clear inference is that Title VII
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collective bargaining agreement unit who complained that he had been
discharged because of his race. 13 The employer in that case alleged that the
termination was justified by the employee's poor work performance.' 4
Following the discharge, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the
employee that was arbitrated under the just cause provision of the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. It
raised his complaint of race discrimination in the arbitration. In the
interim, the employee also filed a Title VII complaint in Federal Court."
The arbitrator's decision denied the grievance, concluding that the
discharge was for just cause, but did not specifically address the question of
racial discrimination. Subsequent to the arbitrator's decision, the employer
moved for summary judgment on the Title VII complaint.' 6 The District
Court agreed with the employer's argument that the employee in this case
was barred from bringing a cause of action under Title VII due to the
finality of the Arbitrators' decision, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 7 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the employee was not barred from
prosecuting his Title VII complaint, despite the arbitrator's decision."
The question before the Court in Gardner-Denver was whether a
union's agreement to arbitrate statutory complaints could comprise a
plaintiff's right to sue under Title VII.' 9 The Court found that it could not,
referencing the potential disharmony between the interest of the Union and
its individual members. 20 The Court's holding declared:
[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights
under Title VII .... It is true, of course, that a union may waive
certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the
right to strike. These rights are conferred on employees
collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly
may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-
bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members.
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to
equal employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are
absolute and represent a congressional command that each
was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination.").
13. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S at 39.
14. See id. at 38.
15. See id. at 39, 42.
16. See id. at 43.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 59-60.
19. See id. at 45-46.
20. See id. at 55.
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employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the
rights conferred can form no part of the collective bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII.
21
The Gardner-Denver Court also found that arbitration was an
inappropriate forum for resolving Title VII complaints.22 The Court noted
that arbitrators did not have the experience or authority to enforce statutory
complaints as opposed to the area of collective bargaining agreement.23 In
addition, the Court expressed uneasiness with the fact-finding procedures
in arbitration. It further said that the lack of regulation of arbitration
hearings, particularly the lack of applicability of the rules of evidence and
the absence of discovery, cross examination and testimony under oath,
made arbitration less suitable than Article III courts for Title VII com-
plaints.24 Lastly, in dismissing all of the employer's contentions, the
Gardner-Denver Court declared that "federal policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment
practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue
fully both his remedy under grievance arbitration clause of a collective-
bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." 25
B. From Gardner-Denver to Gilmer
Since Gardner-Denver was decided, the Supreme Court has upheld
the notion in Gardner-Denver on two occasions. The first was in
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,26 and the second was in
McDonald v City of West Branch, Michigan. On both occasions, the
Court held that employees claiming rights under a collective bargaining
agreement could pursue those rights in court in addition to the procedures
provided for by the agreement.
28
In Barrentine, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time spent on
safety inspections and transportation. 29 After the arbitrator found for the
employer, the employees filed a complaint in federal court against the
employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)3° and against the
21. See id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
22. See id. at 56.
23. See id. at 57 n. 18.
24. See id. 57.
25. See id. at 59-60.
26. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
27. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
28. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
29. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730-731.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1978).
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union for breach of its duty of fair representation.3 The district court found
in favor of the employees, but avoided discussing the complaint under the
FLSA.32 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, with Circuit Judge
Heaney dissenting on the FLSA complaint, and found that the district court
had correctly refused to discuss the FLSA complaint.33 The Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision that the employees were barred from
pursuing their complaint in federal court.34 The Supreme Court explained
that courts are not required to defer to arbitration decisions when individual
statutory rights are at risk.35 The Court then concluded, while citing
Gardner-Denver, that statutory complaints were better reserved for
determination by a court, thereby determining that Congress intended to
afford individual employees a non-waivable right to bring wage claims in
federal court.36
Following the Barrentine ruling, the Court was presented with another
disharmony between statutory rights and rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. The Plaintiff in McDonald v. City of West Branch,
Michigan was discharged from the police force and after losing in
arbitration, he filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a vio-
lation of first amendment rights.37 The jury's verdict found for the plaintiff
against only one defendant, the chief of police, Paul Longstreet.38 The Sixth
Circuit reversed the judgment against Longstreeet, pronouncing that the
arbitration agreement bound the parties. 39 Adhering to Gardner-Denver
and Barrentine, the Supreme Court underscored that Congress intended
complaints such as section 1983 to be adjudicated by courts and not
31. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730-33.
32. See id. at 733.
33. See id. at 733-34; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.
1980).
34. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734.
35. See id. at 737 (explaining that "while courts should defer to an arbitral decision
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of the collective bargaining
agreement, different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights
arising out a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantee to individual
workers.").
36. See id. at 739-46. The dissenting Justices agreed with the majority that an
individual's "congressionally created" FLSA rights "may not be waived through a
collective-bargaining agreement between an employer and the worker's union or through a
direct agreement between an individual worker and the employer." Id. at 746.
37. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1984).
38. See id. at 286 n.3 (pursuing a complaint against Longstreet as well as the following
city officials: Acting City Manager Bernard Olson, City Attorney Charles Jennings, and
City Attorney Demetre Ellias).
39. See id. at 286-87 (finding no abuse in the arbitration procedure, the Court of
Appeals determined that McDonald's First Amendment complaint was barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel).
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arbitrators.40 The Court analogized section 1983 to Title VII and FLSA and
pursued the congressional objective to have courts decide matters under
those statutes.4 ' Although the Supreme Court had held that employees'
statutory right to trial under Title VII, FLSA or section 1983 is not barred
by submitting complaints to arbitration under the collective bargaining
42agreement, the Court in Gilmer ruled that statutory complaints could be
bound by an arbitration agreement.
In Gilmer, the 62-year-old plaintiff was discharged from his position
as manager of financial services." As a condition of employment, plaintiff
was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange. 45  The
registration included an arbitration provision in which plaintiff agreed to
arbitrate any dispute arising from his employment.46 Plaintiff was not a
member of a collective bargaining unit and, thus, had signed the agreement
in his individual role.47 When his employment was terminated, plaintiff
filed a complaint under the ADEA, and his employer moved to enforce the
arbitration agreement.48 The district court relied on Gardner-Denver and
upheld plaintiffs right to pursue his statutory claim in federal court.49
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision after finding "nothing in
the legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA including a
congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements."5 °
The Gilmer Court began its analysis by looking at cases that compelled
arbitration of statutory complaints on the basis that by agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory complaint, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute, it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum. 51 The Court then found that absent a legislative intent
against waivers, the ADEA did not bar arbitration of statutory rights. 2 The
Court explained that looking at "the text of the ADEA, its legislative
history and the ADEA underlying purpose," could rebut the presumption in
40. See id. at 288-90.
41. See id. at 293.
42. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 34 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald, 466 U.S. 284.
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
44. See id. at 23.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 33.
48. See id. 23-24.
49. See id. at 24.
50. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990).
51. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 623 (1985).
52. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (stating that "it is by now clear that statutory claims may
be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the [Federal Arbitration
Act]").
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favor of arbitration13 At least one commentator has aptly observed that the
plaintiff in Gilmer lost on appeal because he failed to prove that Congress
intended to bar arbitration of ADEA complaints.54
The Gilmer Court set aside several of the plaintiff's arguments. One
of the arguments advanced by the plaintiff and rejected by the Court is that
arbitration provides an inadequate forum for resolving employment
discrimination complaints. The Court also rejected plaintiffs claim that
arbitration provided insufficient discovery procedures for the pursuit of
employment discrimination complaints, contending that this component
was counterbalanced by the fact that arbitrators are not bound by rules of
evidence.56 In addition, the plaintiff in Gilmer referred to the authority of
Gardner-Denver in support of his complaint. The Court, instead of
undermining its earlier decision, distinguished Gardner-Denver in three
aspects.57 First, it noted that Gardner-Denver arose out of a collective
bargaining agreement, presenting a 'wrangle between collective rights and
individual statutory rights,' while in the Gilmer scenario, the disputes were
not controlled by a Union. Moreover, Gardner-Denver was concerned with
the tension between the prohibitive effects of an arbitration decision and
the right to eventually litigate a statutory complaint; however, the question
before the Gilmer Court was whether an individual agreement to arbitrate a
statutory complaint could be imposed. And finally, the Court distinguished
Gardner-Denver on the grounds that Gilmer, unrelated to Gardner-Denver,
was determined under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 58
Subsequent to Gilmer, several lower courts have raised questions
about the validity of Gardner-Denver. 9 One of those cases is Austin,6°
which involved a plaintiff who was a member of a bargaining unit. Her
bargaining agent had negotiated a contract provision providing for
mandatory arbitration. 6' The collective bargaining agreement also
contained an antidiscrimination clause subject to arbitration procedure.62
Due to this provision in the collective bargaining agreement, the Fourth
53. See id.
54. T. Christopher Baile, Comment, Reconciling Alexander and Gilmer: Explaining the
Continued Validity of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. in the Context of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 43 ST. Louis U. L. J. 219, 243 (1999).
55. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
56. See id. at 31.
57. See id. at 35.
58. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 730-31 (1981).
59. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996); Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997), reh'g
granted, 124 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997); Varner v.
National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912.
60. Austin, 78 F.3d at 875.
61. See id. at 875.
62. See id. at 879-80.
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Circuit concluded that plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to submit her
discrimination complaint to the grievance procedure and dismissed her
complaint when she failed to invoke the grievance and arbitration
procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. 63  The Fourth Circuit
directed its reasoning on Gilmer and examined Title VII and the ADA to
ascertain whether Congress elected to bar waiver of statutory rights.64 The
Fourth Circuit found no such election and discovered that both the ADA
and Civil Rights Act, amending Title VII, contained language inspiring the
exercise of alternative dispute resolution.65 Because both statutes address
voluntary exercise of alternative dispute resolution, the Fourth Circuit
erroneously neglected the authority of Congress and concluded that Austin
involved a voluntary arbitration. 66
In another case, Martin v. Dana Corp. ,67 concerning an anti-
discrimination provision, the Third Circuit upheld a mandatory arbitration
provision in a collective bargaining agreement. 68 In that case, the plaintiff,
who brought a Title VII complaint against his employer, was a member of
a collective bargaining unit.69  The employer moved to dismiss the
complaint and enforce the collective bargaining agreement. 70 The district
court dismissed Gardner-Denver's authority and accepted the reasoning in
Austin to find for the employer.7 ' The Third Circuit affirmed the decision. 2
What these post-Gilmer cases have in common is their lack of appreciation
for the distinction between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer which had been
drawn by the Gilmer Court and the diverse statutory schemes under which
these two cases were determined.
The next section discusses the congressional history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, and concludes that despite encouragement of ADR,
Congress considered prospective waivers of Title VII rights inappropriate
63. See id. at 885.
64. See id. at 880-82.
65. See id. at 881. But see Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 965 F.
Supp. 190, 199 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that Congress did not intend to permit compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims and the arbitral forum at issue was inadequate to resolve the
plaintiff's ADEA claim).
66. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86; see also Harvey S. Mars, An Overview of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and its Impact upon Federal Labor Law, 12 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 251 (1995) (maintaining that the Austin court neglected the authority of Congress and
made an erroneous conclusion).
67. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997), reh'g granted, 124 F.3d 590 (3d
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1997).
68. Martin, No. 96-1746, 1997 WL 313054, at *1 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Martin, 114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997) (vacating its decision and granting a
rehearing, en banc. The case was remanded and later reversed the lower court's decision
without issuing a published opinion).
72. See id.
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in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. The section also
contends that prospective waivers of Title VII rights are not only inherently
against public policy, but also contravene the congressional objectives to
eliminate employment discrimination.
II. WHY GARDNER-DENVER REMAINS GOOD LAW
Despite the fact that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Austin raised
doubts as to the validity of Gardner-Denver, Gilmer did not undermine the
Court's prior decision. A review of Circuit Court decisions demonstrates
that the Gardner-Denver holding remains good law with respect to
collective bargaining agreements,73 while Gilmer is limited to individual
circumstances outside the collective bargaining agreement. 4  The
following section examines the validity of the Gardner-Denver decision
and critiques the reasoning in Austin. Viewed in their entirety, the
congressional history of both Title VII and the ADA indicate that Congress
has shown no election of ratifying arbitration of statutory complaints as an
exclusive forum.
A. The Error in Austin and the Validity of Gardner-Denver
Despite the general policy favoring arbitration, all Circuit Courts of
Appeals except the Fourth Circuit have held that labor unions cannot waive
individual employee statutory rights to a judicial forum. 75 Subsequent to the
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions, two lines of cases have emerged. In
the first line of cases, which begins with Gardner-Denver, the Court has
determined that submission of discrimination complaints to binding
73. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1019 (2001) (adopting the majority view that "Alexander and its progeny
,remain good law and that statutory employment claims are independent of a collective
bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures."') (citations omitted); Pryner
v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997);
Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Super
Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912; Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d
115 (2d Cir. 1995).
74. See Kirkendall v. United Parcel Serv., 964 F. Supp. 106, 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
75. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 975, 882 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996) (compelling arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims
under an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement); but see sources cited supra
note 72 (upholding Gardner-Denver). Several other courts have used the reasoning
employed in the Austin majority. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d
698, 699 (11 th Cir. 1992) (requiring arbitration of Title VII claim brought by stockbroker
who had signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes with the employer); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that an employee who filed
a sexual harassment suit did not meet her Gilmer burden). But see Penny, 128 F.3d at 408
(refusing to compel arbitration on the basis of the Austin majority opinion).
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arbitration in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement does not
bar successive litigation of an identical complaint in federal court.
7 6 In the
second line of cases, the Supreme Court found arbitration of statutory
complaints appropriate. The Gilmer Court found that the FAA required
arbitration of complaints under the ADEA. Prior to Gilmer, the Court held
that not all statutory complaints are proper for arbitration, and it reiterated
the two step process for arbitrability of statutory complaints articulated in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.
7 7 Under
that process, a court asked to enforce an arbitration clause purporting to
reach statutory complaints must first determine whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that particular type of dispute.
78 Assuming there is sufficient
evidence of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, the court must then look
within the language of the statute at question for evidence that Congress
did not elect that complaints under it be subject to arbitration.
79  The
Gilmer Court applied this test in the context of the ADEA and found that
the question was within the ambit of the arbitration arrangement, and that
nothing in the ADEA evidenced a congressional resolution that such
complaint should not be arbitrated. 80
The Austin opinion trusted Gilmer's holding that an individual may
agree to arbitrate statutory complaints, such as those found in Title VII and
the ADA. The toxic error in Austin is its failure to appreciate the holdings
in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, particularly with regard to the distinctions
made in Gilmer.8' The Austin court fundamentally discards the decision in
Gardner-Denver by stating that "Gilmer thus rejects the principal
construction in... [Gardner-Denver] ... that arbitration is an 'inappro-
priate forum' for the resolution of Title VII rights.
82 Fortunately, Austin
has not generated many supporters. In fact Judge Hall, the dissenting panel
member in Austin, who convincingly argued that nothing about Gilmer
alters Gardner-Denver's holding that a "labor union may not prospectively
waive a member's individual rights to choose a judicial forum for a
76. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
77. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (involving a construction dispute in which the constructor
filed a federal lawsuit seeking to compel arbitration. Before the suit, the hospital sought
declaratory relief in a state court that the matter was not arbitrable. Both suits involved the
same issue: whether the dispute should be arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed a Court
of Appeals decision compelling arbitration. The decision referred to a "federal policy
favoring arbitration" and pronounced boldly that "we vigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate.") (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626-28 (1985)).
78. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
79. See id. at 627.
80. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991).
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
82. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
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statutory claim, ' 83 has often been cited with more approval than the
majority. 84 One case in point was decided two months after Austin, in
which the Eleventh Circuit, faced with an identical question, rejected the
result and reasoning of the Fourth Circuit" in Austin and found Judge
Hall's dissent more persuasive.
Furthermore, two other court decisions have criticized Austin on
separate grounds. In the first decision, the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana expressed dissatisfaction that "Austin is not an accurate
interpretation of federal law as it presently stands. 86 In the second
decision, the United State District Court in the Northern District of
California criticized that the "Austin majority minimizes the factual
differences between an agreement to arbitrate in the context of a simple
employment contract and such an agreement in the collective bargaining
agreement context" and agreed with Judge Hall's dissent that this
"difference makes all the difference.', 87  Moreover, a number of court
decisions display more fidelity to the Court's holding in Gardner-Denver
and Gilmer than does Austin.88 In previous cases, the Court had emphasized
the difference between contractual rights under collective bargaining
agreement and individual statutory rights, the narrow authority and power
of arbitrators, and the possible disharmony in interests between labor
unions engaged in collective representation and an individual employee.8 9
This is why Gilmer emphasized that the plaintiff in that case had entered
into an individual employment agreement to arbitrate statutory complaints
outside the collective bargaining agreement context. 90
Therefore, with regard to statutory complaints under collective
bargaining agreements, Gardner-Denver is undoubtedly good law and
represents the correct interpretation of federal law with regard to statutory
complaints under collective bargaining agreement while Gilmer, on the
other hand, is limited to an individual agreement negotiated by employees.
83. See id. at 886.
84. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997);
Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 927 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp.
737, 743 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
85. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 526.
86. See Pryner, 927 F. Supp. at 1145.
87. Buckley, 949 F. Supp. at 743.
88. See cases cited supra note 73.
89. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 34-35 (1974); see also Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); McDonald v. City of West
Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 734-35 (1981).
90. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (emphasizing that Gilmer only involved individual statutory
rights unlike Gardner-Denver where "there was a concern about the tension between
collective representation and individual statutory rights that is not applicable in this case.").
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In other words, while an individual is free to waive his rights to a judicial
forum, a workers' union, through its negotiations with the employer, may
not. This is the distinction between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer that
Austin failed to appreciate. Furthermore, assuming there was a split in the
circuits as some commentators have contended,
9' then such split was
resolved by the recent Supreme Court decision in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Services.92 In Wright, the Supreme Court conclusively rejected a
comparable argument that prevailed in Austin, thereby inherently under-
mining Austin.93 If there were anything to be learned from the Austin
opinion, it would be an example of what is not the declared plan of Title
VII and the ADA. It should be found to be an erroneous interpretation of
both legislative histories.94
B. Congressional History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the ADA
In Austin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alleged the statutory
language of the Civil Rights Act and the ADA manifested congressional
acquiescence of arbitration of discrimination complaints, and found support
for this declaration. 95 The problem with the Fourth Circuit's rationale is
91. See, e.g., William W. Fick, Gnawing at Gilmer: Giving Teeth to "Consent" in
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 17 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 965 (1999) (exploring the
circuit split over enforceability of arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement);
Lynette Oka, Disarray in the Circuits After Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 9 HARV. L.
REV. 605 (1987) (dismissing the confusion in the circuits after Gardner-Denver).
92. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
93. See id. at 80; Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
that Austin was implicitly overruled by the Wright decision in which the Supreme Court
rejected the same argument that prevailed in Austin); see also Wright, 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
In Wright, the employee brought an ADA claim against his employer who contended that
such claims must be arbitrated under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Wright, 525 U.S. at 72-75. The Supreme Court held that the normal presumption of
arbitrability of claims does not apply to statutory claims but decided that "a clear and
unmistakable" agreement to arbitrate would prevent litigation. Id. at 79-80. The record
presented that Wright was not forced to arbitrate because a clear and unmistakable waiver of
statutory rights was not presented. Id. at 70.
94. Both Title VII and the ADA were created with similar purposes and objectives-to
rid the nation of the evils of discrimination in the workplace--except the ADA addresses the
problem by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability while Title VII on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2[§703]; 42 U.S.C. §12112;
see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (discussing that the purpose of Title
VII was to remove barriers in employment); Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
497 (1999) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination).
95. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1995)); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-116,
§ 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1981) (amending
Title VII). In Austin, the court looked at the language of both the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and the ADA, which state "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
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that it neglected to consider the complete legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act, leaning on certain portions of the history in isolation of the
other. A closer consideration of that complete legislative history might
have afforded a different outcome. For example, one critic recently
observed that even though the ADA's legislative history indicates that
arbitration is considered the preferable method of dispute resolution, 96 it
was not meant to supplant federal rights created under the statute. As was
noted in the Judiciary Committee Report on the ADA, arbitration of an
ADA claim was not meant to waive an individual's right to sue under the
Act. The Judiciary Committee pointed out that "any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of
this Act." 97 Additionally, in the House committee report accompanying the
amendments to Title VII, the Committee referred to the language in
Gardner-Denver and said: "this view is consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose
remedial provisions are incorporated by reference in Title I." The
Committee understood that the approach articulated by the Supreme Court
in Gardner-Denver applies equally to the ADA.98
Interpreting the statutory language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the ADA together with their history, Congress has shown no plan of
ratifying arbitration of statutory complaints as an exclusive forum, nor has
it discussed the concern raised in Gardner-Denver about waiver of
statutory rights. As indicated in Gardner-Denver, nothing in the decision
prevents a plaintiff from waiving a cause of action as a result of a
settlement or after having arbitrated the dispute.99 What the Supreme Court
proscribes in Gardner-Denver is the workers' union's ability to negotiate a
prospective waiver of the Plaintiff's rights. This is what the Court found to
be Congress' plan when it amended Title VII and is equally applicable to
the ADA.100 Moreover, a prospective waiver of statutory rights is against
of alternative means of dispute resolution, including.., arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title," and
concluded that that there was no conflict between the arbitration and the purposes of Title
VII and the ADA. Austin, 78 F.3d at 881.
96. See 136 CONG. REC. H4582, H4606 (daily ed. July 12, 1990); see also Baile, supra
note 54, at 244-46; Mars, supra note 66, at 307 n.339.
97. House Comm. on the Judiciary, American With Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. Rep.
No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598; see
also Baile, supra note 54; Mars, supra note 66.
98. H.R. Rep. No. 485 (III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 76-77, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,499-500.
99. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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public policy'0 ' and inconsistent with Congress' objectives to eliminate
discrimination in employment.10 2 Therefore, those courts, such as Austin
and Jesses,10 3 which require arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement on the basis of 'congressional intent', are inconsistent with
federal law and unconvincing] °4
II. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to explore the vitality of Gardner-
Denver and underscore the distinctions drawn by the Gilmer decision. The
exploration critiques the logic and holding in Austin, concluding that the
Austin court fundamentally misconstrued the declared policy behind Title
VII and the ADA insofar as it enforced a union negotiated prospective
waiver of statutory rights. I hope that this Article will contribute to the
debate on the harmony between the Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions.
To demonstrate the harmony between the two decisions, consider the
101. See William v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 926 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
prospective waiver of "an individual's right to equal employment opportunities" would
defeat the purpose behind Title VII); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d
313, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Gardner-Denver as holding that in the context of consent
decrees and other settlement agreements, a waiver of prospective claims under Title VII
violates public policy).
102. Compare Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (discussing that the
purpose of Title VII was to remove barriers in employment), with Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination), and Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (stating that the purpose
of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination), and PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (stating that
Congress enacted the ADA to remedy widespread discrimination).
103. Jesses v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky. 1996)
(relying on Austin's interpretation of the ADA's legislative history to require arbitration of a
complaint under that statute).
104. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 927 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (noting that
"it is the court's assessment that Austin is not an accurate interpretation of federal law as it
presently stands"); see also Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526
(1 th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the result and reasoning in Austin, and finding Judge Hall dissent
persuasive); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing
to compel arbitration of employee Title VII claims pursuant to arbitration agreement in
securities registration application, finding that the waiver was not made knowingly as
required by Congress in the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act); Lachance v.
Northeast Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp 177, 187 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating, "though Congress
wanted to encourage arbitration of ADA claims, it also clearly intended that aggrieved
individuals retain the right to pursue a claim in a judicial forum. Precluding plaintiffs claim
would contravene the intent of the ADA."); Hill v. Am. Nat'l Can Co./Foster Forbes Glass
Div., 952 F. Supp. 398, 407 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that "the history of [the ADA's]
enactment clarifies the law established in [Gardner-Denver] specifically with respect to the
ADA. Clearly, Congress intended citizens to have a clear path to the rights and remedies
created by the ADA.").
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following two hypothetical scenarios.
Assume that Abner, a 55-year-old salesperson who lost his job several
months ago, applies for a job opening at a large restaurant chain. Prior to
his interview, Abner obtains from his prospective employer a booklet
marked "Acknowledgment of Working Conditions" (AWC). He fills out an
application form, takes a standard restaurant management test and provides
referrals. Following an interview, Abner is offered the position as an
assistant general manager. He accepts the position without reading the
AWC. Few days later he reads the AWC. It outlines various corporate rules
and policies regarding holidays, parking spaces, overtime, dress code,
obscene behaviors, tardiness, etc. On the last page it provides, "I further
acknowledge and agree that any claim concerning, or arising out of
employment or its termination shall be subject to final and binding
arbitration rules maintained by the employer at its corporate headquarters."
Assume further that after working for three years, Abner gets injured on the
job. He sustains back injuries and develops a skin condition on both hands
that prevents him from working in his current position. Abner leaves work
for three weeks to attend to his injuries. Prior to returning, he requests the
employer to transfer him to a light work assignment. The employer refuses
his request and terminates his employment.
Abner believes that he has suffered discrimination on the basis of his
handicap and age and files a lawsuit in federal court alleging violation of
the ADEA and ADA. The employer files a motion to enforce the arbitration
agreement. Does the employer in this hypothetical succeed against Abner?
The answer is most likely yes. The court will probably enforce the
arbitration agreement with regard to the ADEA claims pursuant to Gilmer
but not the ADA claims. The reasons are threefold. First, Abner's
agreement to arbitrate would likely be enforced because he entered into that
agreement in his individual capacity and the Court has found no legislative
intent that prohibits arbitration of ADEA claims. 10 5 Secondly, while the
AWC effectuates an effective waiver of Abner's statutory rights, the Court
would possibly deny compelling arbitration of ADA claims because in the
ADA Congress intended to bar arbitration of statutory claims as an
exclusive forum. Furthermore, Abner would not be forced to arbitrate
because of lack of a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of statutory rights. 10 6
In contrast, consider these facts that favor the need for a continued
fidelity to Gardner-Denver. After Abner is fired from his restaurant job, he
gets another job with a unionized restaurant chain. Given his experience
with his previous employer, Abner joins the union, which had recently
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement covering a period of 5 years.
105. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
106. Wright, 525 U.S. 70 (1998). See Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2000) (exemplifying what courts have accepted as clear and unmistakable language).
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The agreement refers "all complaints, disputes or grievances" to binding
arbitration. It provides in pertinent part: "The agreement shall confer no
individual rights on an employee and may be enforced only by the union
and the employer. Any agreement between the Union and the employer
shall be binding upon the employee involved." Further assume that
Abner's career with this employer was marked by repeated conflicts with
supervisors and co-workers, most of whom were also union officials. He
received in excess of ten complaints covering his use of profanity, poor
performance and absenteeism. During his last year of employment, Abner
became a born again Christian. Nevertheless, his problems persisted. For
example, he was suspended for refusing to work on a Sunday. The Union
challenged the decision to terminate and Abner was reinstated. After his
reinstatement, Abner continued to disagree with his co-workers and
supervisors. He is called names such as "dumb born again Christian" and
ridiculed that "God may have your soul, but your ass belongs to me."
Along with these developments, Abner continues to rack up disciplinary
warnings until he is finally terminated on the basis of his disciplinary
history, inability to work with others, and general disruptive attitude.
The Union grieves Abner's termination and after an arbitration
hearing, the Arbitrator finds for the employer without mentioning Abner's
religion complaints. Abner believes he has been discriminated against on
the basis of his religion and files a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Following an investigation, he is granted the
right to sue. He then files a federal lawsuit for violation of this Title VII
rights and the employer moves to dismiss his claims on the grounds that the
arbitration decision bars his complaint. The question is, should the
employer prevail on this claim? The answer is probably no because
arbitration of discrimination claims pursuant to the grievance procedures
contained in collective bargaining agreement does not bar a union
employee from subsequently pursuing the same discrimination claim in
federal court under Title VII. 1 7 This hypothetical is clearly distinguishable
from the first in that it involves a union-negotiated waiver of statutory
rights: something the Court in Gardner-Denver explicitly prohibited.
°8
This distinction "makes all the difference" and demands a different
outcome.109 Moreover, the second hypothetical conclusively shows why
Gardner-Denver should enjoy a continuing validity. In this situation where
a union employee has a long history of hostility with a great number of
supervisors and co-workers, including union officials, it could reasonably
be assumed that such union officials have little to lose politically and
107. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
108. Id. at 49-53.
109. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
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conceivably something to gain if an arbitrator upholds a decision to
terminate an employee such as Abner. Under these circumstances, there
could be reasonable apprehension that the union representation in an
arbitration hearing might even be less than energetic. It is of little
importance whether or not this is precise in most situations; the significant
thing is that there is a possibility of it. Therefore, the validity of Gardner-
Denver would be best suited for similar cases.
Much can be made of the need to recognize the continued validity of
the Gardner-Denver ruling. Congress demonstrated, and the Supreme
Court upheld, that the arbitration provision in a collective bargaining
agreement does not bar a union employee from pursuing his Title VII
statutory rights in federal court. The Gilmer ruling, while restrictive of
Gardner-Denver, did not supersede the validity of Gardner-Denver. The
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act shows clearly that Congress made
a considered decision that the Gilmer rationale should only be applicable to
individual employees outside the union setting.
This Article calls for the Supreme Court to clarify the Gilmer
distinctions and requires courts to distinguish cases where arbitration
agreements were contained within individual employment contracts from
those in collective bargaining agreements. In considering whether to
enforce an arbitration agreement, a court should also examine whether the
union prospectively waived the statutory rights of the individual employee,
or whether the employee made the agreement voluntary. If that is
creditable, then the next inquiry should be whether the language in the
agreement evinces a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of statutory rights by
such an employee."°
110. See Wright, 528 U.S. 70 (1998). Following the Wright decision, most employers
have successfully avoided Gardner-Denver by expressly listing statutory grounds in
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2000).
